


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

the new cars:

symptom of a sick society

manfred macarthur

the freedom to go

paul goodman



FEB 25 1959

the clue to middle east crises

paul mattick

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In This Issue:

PAUL MATTICK, who lives in Boston, has contributed articles on economic and political subjects to *Partisan Review*, *Dissent*, the *Socialist Leader*, and other magazines in this country and abroad.

The Empire City, a one-volume edition of four novels by PAUL GOODMAN, will be published by Bobbs-Merrill on May 1st.

ROBIN PRISING was a civilian prisoner of war of the Japanese in Santo Tomas prison camp, in Manila, from January 1942 to February 1945. He was eight years old when the United States entered World War II. He is now an actor, and gives poetry readings with a strong emphasis on peace.

JUDITH MALINA plays the leading role in William Carlos Williams' new play, *Many Loves*, which is currently being presented at the Living Theatre in New York.

STUART Z. PERKOFF is a young poet who lives in Ocean Park, California.

THE COVER is by Vera Williams.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., one of our Contributors, whose letter appears on the back cover, will be the featured speaker at the thirty-sixth annual dinner of the War Resisters League, to be held at 6:30 on Monday, February 2nd, at the

Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City. The dinner will honor A. J. Muste.

NEXT MONTH we will have a feature article by Elinor Gene Hoffman—"Trapped by Thomas Jefferson; or How We Declared Independence in Pasadena." It tells of what happened to a liberal white couple when they moved into a new home and, unlike their neighbors, decided to send their children to the local public school, whose population was eighty-five per cent non-white. Other articles will include "Satyagraha in the Slums?" by Staughton Lynd, "Can Either Communism or Capitalism Survive Coexistence?" by Sidney Lens, and the latest installment of A. J. Muste's autobiography.

THE EDITORS recently held a special conference to re-evaluate the role of LIBERATION, and to consider methods of improving the magazine. Specific plans were made to devote two pages a month to brief, signed editorials, two pages to book reviews, and one page to letters from our subscribers. We feel that signed editorials will give the Editors a little more scope for individual style and emphasis than has been possible in the past. We trust that our readers will take advantage of the opportunity to send in brief comments on the ideas being discussed in the pages of LIBERATION.

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CUBAN REVOLUTION

It is an example of the cynicism and confusion brought about by World War II and by the Cold War that the American people were so long indifferent to the American business and political support for the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. Many Americans must feel shame at realizing how far we have gone from applying democratic ideals internationally. It has taken the Castro revolution, supported by an extraordinary unanimity of the Cuban people, to reveal to many just how rotten the Batista dictatorship was.

Some of the most influential American voices in Cuba under Batista have been American gangsters, particularly the notorious Meyer Lansky, a former associate of Murder, Inc., often mentioned as a professional killer. These men have been running the big gambling casinos which helped to finance the Batista regime. It is too early to say whether the new government will be able to get rid of these thugs and gunmen. Does it occur to the American people that it should be partly our concern not to be represented by such men?

The Cuban revolution potentially represents more than a change of government of the sort we are familiar with in Latin America. We do not know whether things will again slip back into the old corrupt patterns. If this country cannot keep hands off altogether (and it appears that it cannot), then American influence should at least be thrown on the side of decency and honesty. What has happened to us that this needs to be said?

As for the rest of Latin America, there are at least two other dictators still in power, the vicious Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic, who maintains a terror system in New York City, and Stroessner, in Paraguay. What prevents our State Department from saying what most Americans feel about these governments? Is Mr. Dulles so much under the spell of *realpolitik* that he is incapable of seeing any moral issues anywhere in the world except in Communist countries?

The Cuban people have administered a lesson, not only to Batista, but to the United States. The Cuban revolution of 1959, the most important in this hemisphere since the Mexican revolution of 1917, calls for a new look in American foreign policy. It is our own State Department which now needs the revolution.

R. F.

UNDERGROUND "LIVING"

Unfortunately, the staggering advances in mechanical science which have made possible the launching of America's Atlas and Russia's Mecha have done nothing to transform either country morally. With irreproachable logic, therefore, but, let us hope, with an exaggerated view of man's relentless stupidity, the director of the New York State Civil Defense Commission has made the following prediction:

Lieut. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner ... predicted yesterday that within five years most Americans would be living in fallout shelters and would see sunshine only by taking a calculated risk.

Underground living will be enforced, he said, by the grim realities of a world in which even small countries would possess enough standardized intercontinental ballistic missiles to "take out" any other nation. (New York Times, Jan. 8)

Meanwhile, Ford and Coca-Cola, who live in the best possible of all possible worlds, are planning to send up satellites to carry their advertising around the world every hundred minutes. This may cause a fallout as devastating to the human spirit as radioactivity is to the body.

But the causes of the two kinds of fallout are interrelated. Economic competition and the massive inequality that currently exists between individuals, classes, and countries lead, in the long run, to violence. Sooner or later, some "have-not" always forces the competition into another arena than that sanctioned by those who have money or privilege or power.

It is hard to believe that the human race lacks the flexibility and intelligence to adjust to its new environment, in which man's almost limitless powers of destruction have rendered obsolete the concepts of national sovereignty, military defense, and economic inequality. But so far there are not many signs of hope. The "die-easies" go on thundering that we must catch up with the Russians in military technology, and the "die-hards" think that they have reached the limits of non-conformity when they have attacked Dulles, advocated integration, or voted Socialist. Economic radicalism is out of fashion, and those who should be revolutionaries are fighting rearguard actions that leave the system unchallenged, under the illusion that this is "political realism".

At the beginning of World War II, W. H. Auden said "We must love one another or die." Now that we have broken the space barrier, it is more urgent than ever that we break

the "mine and thine" barrier which makes rivals, and ultimately enemies, of our fellow earthmen. D. D.

A SENSE OF IDENTITY

We are always impressed with the strange kindness of the American people. Not long ago, ninety-two young children lost their lives in a fire in one of Chicago's Catholic schools. The hearts of Chicago and the nation immediately went out to the grief-stricken families. In three weeks, with almost no solicitation, more than a half million dollars—\$533,000, to be exact—was raised. The prince and the pauper both contributed their \$500 checks and their ten-cent pieces to alleviate in small measure the pain of the families and to achieve for themselves a sense of identity with those who suffered.

One never ceases to wonder at this nobility of the human spirit, both here and in every other country on earth. But one is equally struck by its blindness. The man who works all his life to raise the six to eight thousand dollars needed to send his own son through college, will not contribute a dollar to SANE to save the same son from the dangers of nuclear war or nuclear fall-out. The man who religiously gives to the cancer fund each year will not raise his voice against far greater human tragedies, such as war, or the indignity of Jim Crow.

People are kind when they see the suffering, when they can emote with it. The son going to college is real; the friend who died of cancer was real; the ninety-two children who died in the Chicago fire were so like our own children. But who can visualize ten, twenty million dead in a maelstrom of hydrogen bombs? Who, but a Negro, (or a member of a similar group) can feel and explain the inner pain of racial discrimination?

The human race cannot be hopeless as long as its members can give of themselves—even if only money—to those who have been hurt. But how frustrating it is to those who feel the impact of history's greater cataclysms to know that the nobility of American spirit pivots primarily around charity! When will Americans learn to see the faces of those who died at Hiroshima, as they see the faces of the children who died in Chicago? When will they grow up from their moving-picture view of war to a mature identification with the victims of the greater horrors of our times?

S. L.

THE CLUE TO MIDDLE EAST CRISES

How the power politics of the Cold War combines with Israeli "progressivism" and Arab feudalism to thwart the potentially revolutionary drives of the Middle Eastern peoples.

PAUL MATTICK

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, national revolutions must operate against both feudal reaction and foreign control and are thus extremely weak, tending towards compromise and opportunism. Middle Eastern oil supports both foreign capital and Arab feudalism without relieving the general misery of the Arab population to any noticeable degree. There are many Arab countries and "independent" sheikh-doms within them, each, by itself, incapable of successfully opposing a modern capitalist state. The first condition for a resurgent Arab nationalism is, then, unification, and this unification is constantly sabotaged by the ruling groups of the various Arab nations. There exists, however, some kind of co-operation between them—a defense of their separate interests against foreign imperialism, which confronts them all. However big the sums allotted to the Arab rulers by foreign oil companies, they always remain just part of the profits gained from Middle East oil production. There is the desire for more and, if possible, for all of the profits. Meanwhile political pressure may increase the Arab rulers' shares, as it did in the wake of the abortive nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. At any rate, to make a show of nationalism and to divert resentment over the prevailing misery from themselves to foreign enemies is a trick the Arab rulers know as well as anybody.

While foreign oil-exploitation turns the "nationalism" of oil-rich Arab countries into a bargaining-instrument for Arab rulers and foreign concessionaries, Egypt forms the spearhead of Arab nationalism because of her relative lack of oil-resources and a consequent weaker association between internal feudal and foreign capitalist interests. Yet, in view of the feudal conditions prevailing throughout the Arab countries and in order to



gain and retain their support, Egypt's national revolution does not concentrate on the abolition of feudalism but feeds itself upon attacks on foreign imperialism and Israel. Unable, and perhaps unwilling, to risk radical internal measures to alleviate some of the miseries of the rural poor at the expense of concentrated land ownership, Egypt emphasizes possible future gains through national independence, Arab unification, and native control of national resources. Arab unity—the precondition for effective international actions—prevents effective social-revolutionary actions within the Arab countries.

To be sure, the strictly national character of the Arab movement indicates nothing with regard to the future. At the bottom of this movement, obscured but not removed by it, lies the terrible misery of the Arab masses, yearning not for national independence, unification, and native control, but for sufficient food, shelter, clothing, health and a human existence. Thus, in time, it may come about that the national-revolutionary aspirations take on an increasingly more social-revolutionary character and direct themselves against the internal feudal conditions as well as against foreign capital.

At a time when even the most sophisticated working classes in highly-developed capitalist countries are under the spell of nationalism, it could hardly be expected that the illiterate masses of backward nations would clearly recognize their true class interests. Yet their activities, though directed by ideologists, may very well imply something other than that indicated by the labels under which they operate. Nationalization of foreign property may spill over into nationalization of native property and the rage of poverty may recognize the enemy in the native as well as in the foreign rich. Thus, while in progress, nationalism must be stressed with

always greater fanaticism so as to direct the restive masses from the path of social transformation.

As regards Egypt it is also true, of course, that neither the nationalization nor the distribution of land could really improve her deplorable economic and social conditions. Though either policy would change the character of Egyptian society, it would still need supplementation through industrial development in order to affect living conditions to any appreciable extent. But in view of the extreme poverty that prevails and the dearth of natural resources, effective industrialization lies beyond the possibilities of any national effort. Only in cooperation with other Arab nations and on the strength of their possession of large oil resources—indispensable to Western capitalism—is Egypt's and the Middle East's industrialization feasible at all. Even so, this will be a long-drawn-out process.

For the present, however, social stirrings in the Arab nations are under the control of both true nationalists and of pseudo-nationalists. While the first are as yet unable, the second are still unwilling, to forge an Arab bloc in defiance of Western capitalism. Egyptian nationalist fervor may spread over the whole Arab world, or it may be crushed by both Arab reaction and Western imperialism. It is this situation which explains the vacillating policies of Western nations, and particularly of the United States, towards Arab nationalism. Understood as a diversion from the real social problems in the Arab countries, the rising nationalism is also feared for its possible detrimental effects upon Western interests.

The Soviet Role

Western control of the Middle East could not really be challenged by Arab nations were it not for the existence of the Eastern power bloc and its sympathetic support of newly developing and as yet "uncommitted" nations. For reasons of both defense and expansion, Russia is quite ready to support "national self-determination" wherever it is directed against the Western power bloc. To enforce Western policies in Arab countries by withholding economic and military aid would merely lead to Russia's supplying both. To ruin Egypt's cotton market through dumping—as was once considered—would only radicalize Egyptian nationalism and further Russian influence in the Middle East.

The meagerness and the slowness in the improvement of socio-economic conditions in the Arab nations forces national-revolutionary governments to emphasize political changes in order to make their own existence secure. Hardly is one nationalist goal reached than another must be tried for. The end of the British occupation of Egypt led to demands for the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone; the evacuation of the zone, to its nationaliza-

tion; the nationalization of the canal, to the "Egyptianization" of foreign holdings and enterprises. And thus it goes on in the general direction of complete independence and control over all national resources. In this general direction lies also the re-incorporation of Palestine in a projected Arab bloc of nations and the transformation of these nations into a unified Arab state, even though both projects involve revolutions in and war between, Arab countries as well as war against Israel. This trend may be beset with failures and setbacks and the Arab "heroes" of today may be tomorrow's "traitors."

Appeasement of Arab nationalism can be both useful and dangerous to Western imperialism. Because nationalism was considered useful in the light of America's "global policy," it found some American support, and because it threatened to become dangerous this support was withdrawn. The danger lay in the increasing readiness of Arab nations to accept Russian economic and military aid and in their persistent refusal to change from a position of "neutralism" to full support of Western policies. The trend is rather in the opposite direction, as indicated by anti-Western policies in Syria and Jordan, the growing enmity between Egypt and the nations of the Baghdad pact and the defection of Iraq. To indicate the limits of appeasement, to put Egypt "in her place," the United States refused to honor a previously made promise to finance the Aswan dam project. America's refusal was correctly interpreted as a political move against Arab nationalism in general and the Nasser regime in particular, and it led directly to Nasser's countermove—the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal not only spelled the end of a very lucrative business, hitherto largely controlled by French and British capitalists, but also provided Egypt with a powerful weapon to combat Western imperialism. To control the flow of oil through the canal—oil indispensable to the proper functioning of the West European economies—was an Egyptian advantage much too great to be acceptable to Western capitalism. Nasser's action was recognized as a great triumph of Arab nationalism and found sympathy, or at least lip-service, in all nations emerging from, or still opposing, Western rule. It gave fresh impetus to national-revolutionary movements everywhere and was particularly hailed, and hated, in embattled Algeria. It threatened France's precarious position in North Africa still further and set back her hopes of crushing Algerian nationalism. It was humiliation added to the loss of imperial rule for Great Britain, and it increased Israel's fears of Arab nationalism to the point of obsessive combativeness.

Not immediately affected by the canal's seizure, the United States merely tried to pacify the opponents and

to find ways of appeasing both its Western Allies and Arab nationalism. The search for a compromise solution, which would be satisfactory to all nations, including Egypt, destroyed France's and England's special positions in the canal's control and exploitation, and helped increase their difficulties in Cyprus and Algeria. They were, however, convinced that a *fait accompli* on their part would force the United States to declare herself on the side of her Western allies, the more so because about half of Middle Eastern oil is in American hands.

Still, some hesitation must have accompanied the build-up of the British-French invasion force. Acting in unison with Israel, they did not need to look for a "motive" justifying the invasion of Egypt; yet, no motive, real or false, could stop Russia from intervening on behalf of Egypt. Such intervention would be answered by the United States. However, as neither Russia nor the United States was anxious to go to war, the risk that the invasion would end in a third world war was not too great, and became even smaller because of Russia's serious troubles with her satellites. Apparently, here was an opportunity to gain a limited objective—the subjugation of Egypt—regardless of Russian and American attitudes, and without risking general war.

The Problem of Israel

The Israeli-Arab conflict is not the Middle East's major problem. It is just one aspect of the larger problem of Arab nationalism in its relation to Western imperialism. Assuming there were no Israel, there would still be an Arab struggle for self-determination, unification, and control over national resources. The existence of Israel, however, accentuates Arab nationalism and provides a *raison d'être* for its increasing militancy. On this issue, all Arab nations can unite. Hatred of Israel provides the pseudo-nationalism of Arab feudalism with the aureole of true nationalism. But it is also the medium for a possible growth of Arab unity beyond the confines of feudal interests, and an ever-present incentive to radicalize Arab nationalism.

The state of Israel is a product of both Jewish nationalism and Western imperialism. Although striving towards statehood for many decades—implicitly in the Zionist movement and explicitly since the first World War—Jewish nationalism could not have reached its goal without the support of Western capitalism and a United States-controlled United Nations. From the time that Palestine became a British-administered mandate of the League of Nations, the Arab countries protested and fought the mandate and its provision for a Jewish national home as expressed in the Balfour Declaration. They feared that Jewish immigration and land acquisition would displace the Arabs. Their fears were only too justified. While in 1922 the Jews accounted for eleven per cent of Palestine's total population, in 1945 they accounted for over thirty-one per cent.

Jewish emigration from Europe after the Second World War intensified the Palestine conflicts. The Arab countries fought against the continuation of the mandate; Jews opposed the formation of an Arab state, Arabs that of a Jewish state, and both opposed a bi-national state with equality for Jews and Arabs alike. Existing immigration and land-purchase regulations were overruled by "illegal" Jewish immigration and "illegal" Arab land sales. Hostilities between the mandate-power, the Arabs and the Jews, took on warlike proportions; nor were they resolved by United Nations resolutions for the partitioning of Palestine. The defeat of the Arabs in the 1948 war, however, changed the situation radically; while almost a million Arabs fled the country, a million Jews moved in, and with the help of the West, particularly the United States, the state of Israel came into being.

Disregarding the irrelevant Jewish claim to Palestine for reasons of ancient history, present-day Israel was established through aggression and war. Recognition by the United Nations did not alter but only "legalized" this fact. For the Arab countries, the existence of Israel meant not only displacement of Arabs and loss of property and territory, but the continued close proximity of a hostile state allied to the Western powers. It involves the prospect of further Jewish aggression, for in order to assure its existence, Israel must become strong enough to match not only the strength of any of the neighboring Arab countries but the strength of all these nations together, because their unification is a real possibility. Israel will force her population increase by further immigration, will require more territory, acquire greater productive capacity and strive for military dominance. Meanwhile Israel's miniature imperialism remains attached to Western imperialism.

Of course, Jewish nationalists speak of the "progressive" role they wish to play in the Middle East's development. After all, they *did* introduce modern capitalist methods of production, corresponding social relationships, and forms of government far advanced over those prevailing in the Arab countries. These things, however, are not entirely unknown to the Arab people, for they experienced them before, by way of French and British imperialism. The fictitious "long-run" benefits to be derived from an emulation of Israel's example are no compensation for present and future losses sustained by Israel's "success," a success, furthermore, based primarily on generous hand-outs from abroad. Without American financial aid in various forms, private Jewish contributions from all over the world and German reparations, Israel could not exist at all. In 1955, for example, Israel's imports amounted to three hundred and twenty-six million dollars and her exports to only eighty-six million dollars.

As the external manifestation of Jewish racial, na-

tional and religious sentiments and idiosyncracies and, according to Abba Eban, as a means to prevent "the danger of both physical extinction and of spiritual assimilation," Israel exists as both an ethnic curiosity and an instrument of Western policy. For as long as she finds compassionate and political support in Western nations, she cannot object to the policies of these nations without endangering her own existence. Political "independence" would require a striving towards "self-sufficiency". But this, too, spells expansion of Israel's power and influence, which could not help but sharpen Arab-Jewish rivalries. "Self-sufficiency," however, may well become a necessity, as support from abroad may slowly dry up, or be turned off entirely. Mere survival, then, implies an expansionist Israeli policy, and the accompanying economic and industrial development is bound to conflict in increasing measure with similar aspirations in Arab nations.

Israel and Arab Radicalism

Far from strengthening progressive elements in the Arab world through the example of her own existence, Israel thus sustains Arab reaction and prevents Arab nationalism from emerging into a progressive social force. Feudal opposition to Israel supports feudalism in the Arab countries. But even an emergent national-revolutionary movement must seek political power by continuing opposition to Israel. Its struggle against the Jews is an aspect of its struggle against Arab feudalism, which failed to do away with Israel. For Israel Arab reaction is the "lesser evil," as it signifies a weaker enemy. This explains why Nasser, and not any of the Arab kings, is denounced as a new "Hitler" in Israeli propaganda.

Though entirely indefensible as an expression of Jewish nationalism, Israel finds some justification in the fact that for many Jews her existence meant the difference between life and death. At least in part, Israel is the result of Jewish persecution, first in Czarist Russia, later in Nazi Germany. Not many of the Jews able to escape the horrors of Nazism were Zionists. They found refuge in Palestine because they could not find it elsewhere, and because the Nazi terror reawakened race and national attitudes. And being in Palestine, the Jews' defense of their existence became the defense of Israel, quite independently of previous attitudes toward nationalism and the desire to live in peace with Arab neighbors.

There exists, no doubt, a real desire among large layers of the Jewish population to come to terms with Arab nationalism and to find a common basis for an enduring peace. Similar attitudes exist undoubtedly also within the Arab countries. However, national interests and aspirations are stronger than such subjective attitudes. A real basis for an "enduring peace" could only

be the undoing of history, the return to those conditions where the Jews were no threat to the Arabs and the Arabs no threat to the Jews. A state of official and unofficial warfare, however, stretching over more than three decades, cannot easily be ended; particularly not within the confines of capitalism.

The Suez Debacle

For Israel the mere certainty of French and British support was reason enough to attempt the destruction of the Nasser regime, and thus deliver a powerful blow to Arab nationalism. Not that Israel, being the strongest military power in the area, needed military support from France and Britain—though this was also welcome—but she needed their political support against protesting nations and to win America's assent. To strike at Egypt in alliance with France and England was "the chance of a lifetime." And the Israelis made the most of it—all the while insisting that their march to the Nile was in sheer self-defense. Arab aggression had to be ended there and then, even though the invasion was hardly resisted and the Russian-armed enemy that provided the excuse for the attack was no match for Israel. This was a "preventive war" to avoid a possible future war under circumstances that might be less favorable to Israel. Of course, a weak adversary may still be a nuisance, and though Israel never doubted her military superiority, she complained bitterly and consistently about harassment by Arab marauders, the lack of peace on Israeli terms and the closing of the Suez Canal to her shipping.

Border conflicts and raiding parties are always used to justify aggression and may be dismissed for this reason, as well as for the reason that they are never one-sided affairs. It is true, of course, that the Arabs have never consented to Israel's existence and are deadly serious in their intentions "to drive the Jews into the sea." Yet intentions are meaningless without the ability to carry them out. Discrimination against Jewish shipping, though a fact, is a fact of long standing and was not the immediate cause of Israel's invasion, which can be explained by Israel's desire to crush a potential enemy and in the process of doing so to satisfy her own expansionist needs.

Israel's offensive, justified by Arab "aggression," served then to "justify" the British-French invasion as an attempt to safeguard the Suez Canal and international shipping. Apparently, the best way of accomplishing this consisted in the saturation-bombing of airstrips, the destruction of harbor installations and the flattening-out of Egyptian cities. The Canal was then quite useless, blocked as it was by scuttled ships and other obstacles. Pipelines in Syria were sabotaged, and the oil required for the West European economies had to be hauled around the Cape, or from the United States, in

tankers owned mostly by American companies. The situation which the seizure of the canal had been designed to prevent was created by the seizure itself. There were oil reserves in Western Europe, yet without United States aid, the prospect of serious economic breakdown was not too far off. Freed from possible Egyptian "blackmail" by way of her control of the Canal, Western Europe was now more than ever dependent on the good will of the United States. France and England had their own brand of "blackmail" in the reasonable assumption that the United States would not let them down, for fear of breaking up the Western alliance.

But this turned out to be a great miscalculation. America joined Russia in condemning the invasion and in trying to bring it to an end via the United Nations. Although Russia's prestige in the Middle East was bound to rise as the result of her determined stand against the invasion, so was America's. Long on the wane, the positions of France and England in the Middle East were now completely destroyed and had to be replaced by American influence in order to counter Russian penetration. To allow the three invading nations to stay in Egypt, even if it did not lead to war with Russia, would radicalize Arab nationalism and in all probability lead to guerilla resistance which would receive Russian help. This might endanger oil production and delivery as well as American military installations in the Arab countries almost as much as if Russia controlled the area. For America there was only the choice between joining her allies in taking over the whole of the Middle East by force, or opposing their actions and urging them to get out of Egypt. Piqued as the American politicians were by the underhanded actions of their French and British counterparts, the latter course was not too difficult to execute.


American Policing in Middle East

What was of overwhelming importance for the United States in the Middle East was peace and continued control by Western capitalism. The invasion of Egypt, whatever its results, could only weaken the West European economy and alienate the Arab world still further. There was no point in sapping the strength of the Western world by catering to the particular interests of some of its nations; especially since these nations had already lost the influence they once possessed. Rather, it was necessary to supplant the bankrupt French and British imperialism with the much more powerful controls of the United States. The Eden Government was the first to recognize the futility of opposing the United States. More reluctantly, because hard pressed by the Algerian revolt, France gave in, and after much balking and bargaining, Israel, too, drew back. But Arab nationalism was also potentially checked by the—if only im-

plicit—new invasion threat of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

America's refusal to condone the invasion incorporated a rejection of national political "self-determination" within the Western power bloc. The national aspirations of the less-developed and weaker countries cannot be realized except insofar as they fit into the power schemes of the dominating imperialist nations. The various national rivalries in the Middle East, when kept in "reasonable" bounds, are more effective "self-regulating" levers of control than direct military intervention, which, as in the wake of the recent Iraqi revolution, is reserved as a last resort. Without "outside" interference, now restricted to Russian interference, the various national aspirations would grind each other into insignificance and allow for a successful control of all of them by that nation, or bloc of nations, able to isolate the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, when actually supplemented by an American-installed "Iron Curtain" between Russia and the Middle East, excludes self-determination for any of the Middle Eastern nations. Russia, which never hesitates to destroy most ruthlessly any attempt at national self-determination in countries under her own control, now demands "noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East; respect for the sovereignty and independence of these countries," threatened as they are by the Eisenhower Doctrine. And America, which demands national self-determination for Russia's satellites and their right to break through the Russian-installed "Iron Curtain," does not hesitate to apply to the Middle East policies that she abhors in Eastern Europe.



the new cars:

Symptom of a Sick Society

MANFRED MACARTHUR

JOHN KEATS, in his recently published book *The Insolent Chariots*, presents a thorough indictment of our present-day culture as it is reflected in the American man's attitude towards the American car. He characterizes today's cars as overblown, overpriced monstrosities, built by oafs for other oafs to sell to mental defectives.

Automobiles grow ever lower, faster and more costly to buy and repair. As a result, all our cities become more and more congested. In New York, during the rush hour, it takes more time to drive across Manhattan Island than to walk.

The cars are equipped with engines of three hundred to three hundred and fifty horse power. However, most motorists use their car only to drive to and from work; and during the rush hour, the average speed in most American cities amounts to less than twenty-five miles per hour. Traffic scientists claim, for example, that downtown Washington's top speed amounts to sixteen miles per hour.

Keats, after reviewing all the shortcomings and contradictions of today's American automobile, asks who is the culprit, the manufacturer or the public, and answers that both are at fault. The manufacturer produces and markets the automobile not as a reliable machine but as a symbol of sex, speed, wealth and power. However, recent polls of the car-buying public show that the average new-car buyer is just about the type of imbecile that Keats says the car manufacturer envisages.

At this point we might ask ourselves what we know about new-car buyers, what kind of people they are, and what their financial and professional background is. It happens that the University of Michigan conducts an annual survey which provides some of the answers to these questions. In 1957, more than half of the new-car buyers belonged to the top twenty per cent in family income level. These twenty per cent had a family income of approximately nine thousand dollars or more, as compared to an average income of slightly more than five thousand dollars for all families.

As far as his occupational background is concerned, the typical new-car buyer is a professional person, a well paid white-collar worker with managerial responsibilities, or an independent businessman. Among these groups, roughly fifteen to twenty per cent buy a new car in a typical year. Among unskilled workers, on the other hand, less than five per cent buy a new car.

This of course does not mean that working farmers, working-class people and middle- and lower-income families in general do not own cars. They do. However, they don't buy new cars, but used cars. Among the richest twenty per cent of all families, twice as many buy new cars as used cars. Among the remaining eighty

per cent there are three times as many used-car buyers as new-car buyers.

If we take the poorest sixty per cent of all families, the number of used-car buyers is five times as great as great as the number of new-car buyers. Their needs therefore don't carry any weight with the car manufacturer. They have to be satisfied with what is discarded by the well-to-do.

The distinction between the special needs of the new-car buyer, who counts, and the used-car buyer, who doesn't, explains the thinking of the car manufacturers and why they produce the kind of uneconomical dream-boat they do.

The typical new-car buyer with an income of ten thousand dollars per year is not much impressed by the fact that his oversized engine requires twice as much gasoline as a car equipped with an engine of a more sane design. The smaller engine might save him five dollars per week, which to him is nothing to get excited about. On the other hand, he might lose hundreds of dollars if he owns a small stripped-down car which makes him suspect as a poor credit risk or as a professional failure. In a society in which ability is equated with financial success and financial failure is *ipso facto* considered as conclusive evidence of incompetence, a young businessman, executive or professional person just can't afford an inexpensive car. For such people, conspicuous consumption is a sound business investment.

This may be crazy, as Mr. Keats seems to think. However it is not the individuals who are imbeciles or nit-wits. Instead it is the society in which we live which is insane and which forces individuals to act like imbeciles if they want to seem rational.

The situation is of course very different for the great majority of people, who work in a plant, an office or a store, or own a small farm. While they may have the same aspirations as the high-income groups the fancy car does not help them make a living and is something they can't afford. They are interested in a reliable, inexpensive means of transportation which they can purchase at a low initial cost and which they can drive at a low operating expense.

The American car producer does not pay any attention to these needs of the middle- and lower-income groups. The main reason why up till now no car manufacturer has dared produce a functional, inexpensive car is that they all feared that marketing of the small car would bring about the collapse of the used-car market.

Today a large portion of all new-car buyers trade their car in after one year or two years in exchange for the newest model. These one- to two-year-old used cars sell at approximately sixty per cent of the original retail

price. This means that today's large-volume sellers, when they are one or two years old, sell at between fifteen hundred and two thousand dollars. Since the new small car will sell at approximately fifteen hundred dollars, it becomes obvious that something will have to give. Faced with the choice between a small new car or a large used car at approximately the same initial cost, few buyers will prefer the large used car, which requires much larger gasoline and repair expenditures. Used-car prices of large cars would have to be reduced substantially, and this in turn might affect adversely the market for large new cars. This at least is the fear of the car manufacturers, who figure that they might lose in sales of today's large-volume sellers as much or more than they would gain through the sale of the small car. These considerations, which are openly discussed in the trade magazines, may be right or wrong; they are certainly not irrational, as Keats seems to feel.

In spite of producer-resistance, the American small car is bound to appear on the market soon. The rapid increase in the number of small imported cars will leave the American corporations no alternative. In just seven years the number of small imported cars has increased ten times.

Already, imported cars account for more than five per cent of all new car registrations. It is unlikely that American producers will continue to stand idly by watching their foreign competitors gain a larger and larger share of the United States market.

There are already rumors that Ford and G. M. plan to put a small car into production at the beginning of the 1960 model year. These rumors may be premature, but in any case the American small car is bound to make its appearance pretty soon.

Unfortunately, this development will be of help only to a small portion of the car owners who today customarily buy a used rather than a new car. The reason is that the small car will sell at a price which many of today's used-car buyers won't be able to afford.

It is a fair guess that the small American car will sell at a price approximately ten per cent below the price of an inexpensive small foreign car, or approximately fifteen hundred dollars. Keats thinks of a small car priced at five hundred dollars, but this is wishful thinking.

As compared to the original retail price of today's so called low-priced cars, the small car might offer savings up to forty per cent. However, the small car at fifteen hundred dollars will sell at a price far beyond what the average used-car buyer is able to pay. In 1957, the average price of the used car amounted to nine hundred dollars. Half of all used cars were purchased at a price below seven hundred dollars.

The great majority of today's used-car buyers will have to continue to buy an overgrown, impractical

large car. They will have to continue to spend their money on faded chrome and bothersome tail fins, which were important to the original purchaser as a status symbol but represent a pure waste for the used-car buyer. They will have to continue to pay excessive gasoline bills to feed engines of excessive horse power, even though this means they will have to cut down on the purchase of necessities.

They don't do this because they are sex crazy, speed crazy, or status crazy. The trouble is that these used-car buyers who don't need, and can't afford, a symbol of success but instead need an inexpensive means of transportation have no voice in the matter because they don't appear on the new-car market. They can't make their wishes felt, because they can't back them up with cash.

Actually, we have only started to touch on the contradictions and irrationalities in our present-day methods of transportation. Let's forget for a moment about the talifins, the excessive horsepower, the unusable trunk space, etc., etc. Let's assume that all cars were designed solely as a practical means of transportation. Even under these ideal conditions, it would be true that the more than fifty-five million cars which today are populating our roads represent an outrageous waste. When these cars are used at all, they are used nine times in ten by just one person. Most of the time these millions of cars simply stand idle, parked in front of the plant, the office, or the home. The overwhelming majority, except on a few vacation days, holidays and summer weekends, are used only two hours out of twenty-four. Ninety per cent of the time, these huge agglomerations of steel, glass and rubber are not used by anybody for anything.

The enormous waste inherent in individual car ownership is the basic reason why even in this, the richest country of the world, the average person can't buy decent means of transportation at a price he can afford. The rational answer to this problem would be public transportation, which should be able to offer dependable service at lower cost.

Today's public transportation systems don't offer either. Because of the lack of city planning, and because plant and office locations are determined by private profit considerations rather than by public interest, our city bus and trolley systems are caught in a vicious circle. They are forced to cut down the quality of the service and to raise fares because they have been losing customers, and they continue to lose customers because they have been cutting down the quality of the service and raising fares. Buses and trolley cars run half empty, half the time, thus adding to the general waste.

Similar wastefulness can be found in many other fields. The reason is not that people are imbeciles. The waste is inherent in our present-day economic system. It is caused by the lack of responsible over-all planning.

the new cars: The Freedom to Go

PAUL GOODMAN

I HAVEN'T READ Keats's book, but I can see that it and Macarthur's critique of it provide an excellent example of a dual approach in recent sociology that is inevitable because we have a dual economy that is being analyzed. We have one society but two kinds of money: hard money and soft money, as somebody has called them (I don't know who first). Hard money is the old-fashioned money that you "really" work for, that is measured by labor-time and surplus-value, and that applies on the market, including the market for labor according to an iron law of wages. Soft money is mad-money or sailor-money that has at present, however, skyrocketed in amount; it is not only given away on TV for "personal appearances" or for nothing, and as wild salaries on Madison Avenue and in Hollywood; but also, very generally, it pours into fringe benefits, into long vacations with pay, giveaway foundations to avoid upper-bracket taxes, and even, in an important aspect, social-insurance. Naturally these two moneys have different moralities, and contrasting moralists like Macarthur and Keats.

It is inevitable that we have these two kinds of money, because we have a surplus technology. (In Scheme III of *Communitas* my brother and I suggested making these economies different in specie and not changeable; that would be a moral advantage.) The American machine is working at a small fraction of its productivity, and nevertheless there is a vast surplus of not very desirable wealth produced that simply must be bought up with the soft money. At the same time there is always a core of subsistence production, for men need bread and shelter, and to get this you have to pay, and work for, hard money. It does not seem to me sufficient to discuss this unique historical monster in terms of class-exploitation, reinvestment, and the falling rate of interest—for the soft money pours to all classes. Yet, in power and control, our institutions still *do* work according to the old economic principles. If you omit the old economic analysis, in either your theory or your behavior, you lose out; but if you think and behave *in* those terms, you are quite out of touch with the facts of life, where bureaucratic and leisure values *are* paramount.

So we have two grand streams of social writing that are fantastically uncommunicating. There are the more academic and post-Marxist analysts of institutions, say Mills or Ben Seligman or Lerner or Lundberg or Farrell; and there are the more journalistic and Freudian analysts of mass-culture, like Riesman or Leites or Larrabee and Lynes or Sectorsky. Curiously, each group would probably think the other group is rather conservative and neglects the most important levers of social change. I myself don't know, I have not heard, a unified

theory that avoids the over-determination of these dual interpretations; and frankly, I don't see the need for one, so long as each author honestly works at what seems to him to be the main problem. There is plenty of injustice and folly for all.

My bias is that Keats and Macarthur both are perfectly right about the automobiles with their huge girth and long tails. I do think, however, that by overlooking the crucial factor of our surplus productivity—the President's anguished outcry that it is un-American not to buy, still rings in my soul—both authors are unfair and uncharitable toward our American problem. Keats seems (I have not read him) to neglect, or not sufficiently to stress, the basic need of the market for fashion and novelty that *underlies* the pandering to sex, speed, and prestige. There has to be *some* difference to make the year's model saleable. Put out the most efficient machine you want, and you will still have the problem of how to sell more of it than anybody needs. The experts at this problem are not engineers but "industrial designers". And if you say, stop making the needless cars, then what are *you* going to do with the productivity of America? I don't mean that there is no answer, but that *this* is the question.

Macarthur, on the other hand, seems to me to be very far from the reality with his puritanical remark about saving money and labor and taking trains and buses. Such Veblen-morals apply to an economy of scarcity. *Why* save the money and labor? To increase the time of leisure? But surveys (e. g. in Larrabee and Meyersohn's anthology *Mass-Leisure*) show that it is precisely for leisure that precisely a workingman's car is his chief salvation from absolute inanition. What if the car stands idle outside the plant because the lonely half-hour drive to and from work is the man's most precious hour of the day at either work or leisure? The car is his share in the superabounding wealth; what share would this author give him? On sunny holidays, the working-man will spend long hours "fixing the car"—it is his freedom to Go, though indeed he has nowhere to go, but parks outside the movie.

"The waste," concludes Macarthur, "is caused by lack of responsible over-all planning." If by planning he means socialist planning of production and distribution, I think that this is nonsense (for the American scene). We are already too efficient for our cultural resources. If, however, he means by planning an organic consideration of means and ends, and the education of the souls of men to be able to use practically the wealth of God and man, then, to his surprise, he will have to begin to think of sex and speed and power and all that.

THE ODOR OF DEATH

Robin Prising

STARVATION is impossible to forget. I remember vividly the handful of cornmeal we received twice a day for the last five months of prison camp. It was almost liquid, filled with worms and tiny stones that cracked one's teeth, and we had neither sugar nor salt in it. It was made in huge vats by the strongest men interned with us. They used to stand over the vats stirring it with long paddles that looked like oars. The men often fainted from heat and hunger. On Sundays we were given coconut milk with our meal—it was so delicious that I could barely stand its taste. Of course this is not all we ate; leaves of trees and shrubs, grass, birds, cats and mice we found and cooked for ourselves. Some people managed to save a little canned food and ate it sparingly as long as it lasted.

I remember the time an old man died of starvation. He was found dead in his bed. He always expected times to get worse and saved his canned food under his bed. Everyone started quarrelling over his supplies. In the midst of the argument I stole a can of corned beef. It was so rich and salty, and I gobbled it so quickly, that I became sick at once.

At night we slept fitfully, listening to the movements and cries of rats, our bodies eaten by bedbugs and lice. The tropical heat was most painful, as we had no salt in our food, which created a terrible feeling that we wanted to perspire and could not.

We woke in the morning to a cracked record played over the public address system: "Good morning! Good morning! Sunbeams are dancing..." Then the Japanese would bark orders, over the loudspeaker, which would be translated by an interpreter. This loudspeaker would suddenly come on, all during the day. "Will Mr. Green report to the Commandant's office?" Mr. Brown! Mr. Brown, report to the Commandant's office." It might mean nothing at all—or something very serious. Perhaps Mr. Green had been suspected of having a radio or Mr. Brown of communicating with the outside. That meant torture and perhaps even death. I lived in fear lest my parents' names be called.

Life during the first two years had not been impossible. The loudspeaker was not as active, and the food was adequate. People learned to adapt to crowded conditions. In the dormitories the beds were hardly a foot apart from each other. Some people built shacks around the buildings and during the first two years we were allowed to live in them. There was always work to do: vegetable gardening (produce later confiscated by the Japanese) washing, sweeping and work in the kitchen or the hospital. There were books to read and classes for the children.

We stood in line for food. The lines were long and tiring. We ate from tin cans, old plates or pots and had a spoon and fork. The first year the food was decent. We had cracked-wheat cereal and canned milk for breakfast. Lunch and dinner usually consisted of fish, rice and native greens. We used to get chicken once a week and sweet potatoes. After the first ten months the cracked wheat disappeared and rice cereal was substituted. By the middle of the second year the portions had grown smaller. The fresh fish was supplanted by rotten sun-dried minnows (which I could never eat). The first months of the last year found us on minnow, rice, greens and coconut milk. One by one they all disappeared until we were given the cornmeal rations which had been rotting in the warehouses.

Many Japanese were cruel but some were kind. Most of them liked children, but others teased hungry children with food. "Here baby! Banana" and after giving it to the child the soldier would snatch it back and laugh. Japanese women seemed to be kind though we had few dealings with them. The Geisha and Jo-Ro used to come to gratify the Japanese soldiers. They tripped along in their kimonos and hid food in their long sleeves and tossed it to the children.

Colonel Ohashi was a nice Japanese. He treated me with concern and courtesy. When I was nine my parents had been taken to a hospital outside the main prison camp. This was a small prison hospital for convalecents. Soon after they left I came down with measles, whooping cough and diphtheria, one after the other. When I was recovering Ohashi passed by my bed on his inspection. I begged him to send me to my parents. He was extremely kind and patted my head and told me not to worry, he would do his best. In several weeks he had me transferred. It was obvious that Colonel Ohashi disliked war and the position he was in but like all soldiers he was trained to do his duty. When the American troops arrived he committed *hara-kiri*.

Third-Class People

We had to bow to all Japanese whenever they passed us or spoke to us. They considered us a third-class people (as we were white) and were anxious to remind us of the fact. However it had one advantage (besides being a lesson to colonialists) and that was that white women were usually left alone.

Colonel Shita was the opposite of Colonel Ohashi. He was sadistic and took great joy in slapping faces and seeing us cringe before him. I once pretended I did not see him and received a great clout on the face. He grabbed his sword with such vigor that it came off his

belt—sheath and all—and he brandished it over my head. He yelled and stamped in a fury as I managed to run away. (I was eleven when this happened.)

When the days of starvation came we would have eight or nine deaths a day. The Japanese called it heart failure. Each day a horse and carriage came and was loaded with plywood coffins in which the dead lay.

By this time we were all weak with hunger. I couldn't hold my knees straight and they knocked together when I tried to hurry. At twelve years old I weighed about fifty pounds.

Towards the end of internment we had air-raids every day. American planes bombed military installations. We were forbidden to watch bombings and dog-fights. We did watch them, however, and those caught were forced to stare at the sun, eyes wide open for two hours. A soldier with bayonet made certain of this.

On February 3, 1945, after three years and two months of imprisonment, American tanks burst open the gates of our prison. It seemed such a day of jubilation and triumph. But the Japanese held the larger part of the city and by the next day trained their guns on our prison camp and shelled it by the hour. The shelling continued for many days and there were large casualties. A little girl's mother was killed right before her. I shall never forget how the child went into a daze and wandered about the camp singing "How beautiful is the moon in the tropic night". It was her mother's favorite song. And then people died because they had no strength left and nothing further to live for. Others died from eating too much after months of starvation.

Manila became a city of street fighting. The armless, the legless, the bloodspattered streamed through the streets as the Japanese blew up buildings and the Americans advanced. Death enveloped us in the hot driving sun of those days.

The coffins of the dead piled up in the square before the main building of our camp. There were not enough grave-diggers to bury them quickly enough. The coffins were leaking, and in the hot sun the stench rose, filling the air with the putrid odor of death.

Suddenly, as I was walking among these whitewashed boxes of the dead, I knew that Life was holy and very important. Nothing could justify this massacre. I sickened with the odor of death and in that instant realized the value of life.

It took little time for me to learn that American soldiers were also an army of occupation. Our prison camp was strewn with their litter. Children blew up their used condoms like balloons. They learned the meaning of sex in ugly ways. In the streets of Manila the women offered to sell themselves to the G. I.'s. But instead they would pick out the young sister of a family—perhaps eleven or twelve years old—because she was less likely to carry venereal disease. They were cruel to

the prisoners they took and teased them just as the Japanese had done.

When we were repatriated to America the war was almost over. The Japanese were surrendering everywhere but were often shot instead of being taken prisoners. After I had been in America for three months the news of the bombing of Hiroshima came. "Aren't you glad? We've won the war!" I wept and wept and wept. I was haunted by visions of Japanese faces; the thousands of armless and legless of Manila rushed to my mind. No, the bombing of Hiroshima did no good whatever; it only added to the carnage; it merely heaped the corpses of the war in higher piles. Then Nagasaki was bombed—Japan's most Christian city.

"Tell us about the Japanese atrocities," people would cry. "I bet you're glad to be back in the good old U. S. A." Instead I found myself telling of the last time I saw Colonel Shita. After the American troops came he had been shot as a sniper. He lay in a little room next to the women's lavatory in the main building. He was shot in the belly and lay on the floor groaning and thrashing about. No medical aid was given him. For three days the ex-prisoners filed into the room and watched him. They tore off his buttons for souvenirs. I watched appalled. After I left, a man sliced off his ear with a razor and kept it in alcohol. That night Colonel Shita died.

I wondered why people wanted to know about Japanese atrocities. I didn't realize then that they couldn't really understand what the war meant. It was all like a movie to them.

Today the world stands on the threshold of World War III. This time our great ally Russia has turned into the savage enemy. For years there have been countless opportunities for America and Russia to negotiate for peace. But instead both sides have stockpiled the deadliest weapons known to man. These nations threaten humanity itself with extinction. I refuse to choose between these sides—both offer only death. I refuse to accept the sentimental rubbish that the atomic bombs will never be used. America has already used them on human beings—not only once but twice.

I was very fortunate when my life was spared in World War II. I think it was so that I might be able to raise my voice against war and plead for life. I have seen the death and destruction of war, all of which were the results of soldiers doing their duty. Though I do not hate soldiers, I despise the servility in men that leads them to conform and obey. This is the time to refuse to join armies and instead to parade on the streets against war. Communism can be resisted without the use of arms.

It is almost too late for hope—time is running out swiftly—but faith in life has always triumphed, even where hope has failed.

PILATE WASHING HIS HANDS

JUDITH MALINA

An angel whistled in a sight-bound room.
An augury of gargoyles sucked the light
Through their exquisite mouths,
Their gothic teeth squiring a smile.

NEWS:

Fishermen report strange sight at sea.
Miners find field of flowers under earth.
The grass is tall as trees,
The trees shrunk small as grass.

Away, away, away, nature's gone mad.
Away, away, away, time's lost its mind.

A man has listened to the daily news,
Yet he proceeded sanely to his task,
Has heard the pencilling on the polluted air
Without despair; a man has read
His newspaper, dry-eyed!

Go forth out of the tomb and live again,
Out of the tomb walk forth to see the land.
No longer do the valleys sit
Placid between familiar hills.
Above alarmed mountains
Valleys romp.

Asia stares wide-eyed.
Europe's horde stands stunned.
In the infertile desert no sand stirs.
I think the very universe has stopped
To watch the washing of a mortal hand.

NEWS:

The teacher that has brought us here is dead.
All trains of thought off schedule.
All orbits hushed.
Subsistance crushed.

Let us go out into the street
Where the trees drip God,
And accost strangers, saying:
MY friend:

 The withered sorrel
Nor the stagnate rheum,
Not morbid fungi
Moulting plats of death
Is so diseased or reeks as foul
As you,
 Innocent passer-by.

You mar God's presence room,
Look to your word,
Look to your world,
Look to your creature-hood.

NEWS:

Cretin accosts stranger in the street.
Asiatic prowls sighted in Spain.
The valleys lo, the valleys romp.

Then, will the stranger smile?
(like gothic gargoyles or a painted priest)
Protest his beatitude,
Offer an attitude of innocence?

Or, will the stranger flee?
(like patient mountains, till this era staid)
Escape our accusations,
Admit he overdrew his loot of guilt?

Whatever he will choose,
It is for us to weep.
Arraigned in mail of glory
From whose chips and cracks
The hiss of headlines
Makes a modern noise;
Whatever he will choose
It is for us: Abide.

Take a water to our hand,
Our first taut step alone.
Let the bewildered universe
Experience its first sleep.
Closing the eyes of stars,
Bind up the comet's tail.
Take a water to our hand.

Practice the innocence of Pontius,
Become the brother of Pontius,
Saying, "Let it be as you would have it."

And if the water is crimson.
Amen.

NOT SO LONG AGO

A. J. MUSTE

Autobiography: Part 14

The Early Twenties: Foster and LaFollette

AS HAS BEEN INDICATED in earlier installments, we sought to achieve high educational standards at Brookwood Labor College. The school did not have a body of economic and political doctrine to inculcate. We deliberately sought to stimulate intellectual controversy. On the other hand, we were not academic, in the usual sense of that term, in our approach. We did not conceive of objectivity in the realm of social studies and the humanities as a stance apart, from which one observed social processes as one observes an amoeba under a microscope. We held, as I still do, that any educational institution is placed in a specific social context. There is a constituency which uses its products and whose needs it must in some fundamental sense serve. Such objectivity as is possible for those who work in an educational institution to achieve, is reached by recognizing this fact and by trying to make allowance for biases rather than ignoring their existence.

Another result of our basic approach was that, as students and teachers, we did not think of ourselves as temporarily withdrawn from the labor struggle while preparing for future activity. Geographically, we were off in a somewhat idyllic country setting, and the students were away from their jobs and day-to-day union activities. But psychologically, we were participants in the economic and political movements of that time. Students continued to attend local union meetings if their homes were near enough to permit it. Others might travel farther if there was a crucial policy decision to be made in their unions or a strike in progress.

The school did not, of course, as an organization have representation at labor meetings or seek to influence policy. However, not long after the school was launched, the teachers and other staff members were organized as Local 189 of the American Federation of Teachers, which was an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor, though certainly not a favorite child of its officials. Among the more or less conflicting, but invariably somewhat uncomplimentary, ideas about teacher unionism which typical "labor skates" had in those days, were these: that teachers were too dumb to know how to conduct a labor union properly; that it was not altogether respectable for teachers to be organized like plumbers and plasterers; that these smart teachers would introduce strange and probably subversive ideas into the unions. As union members, none the less, Brookwood teachers gained experience and exerted influence as delegates to city central trade unions and state fed-

eration of labor conventions, as well as to national gatherings of the A. F. of T.

One of the younger members of the staff wrote of some of her experiences:

When appeals for miners' relief went out in the bitter winter of '28, we canvassed Katonah village for clothing and spoke at nearby union meetings for contributions. With another member of the staff, I even tackled the notoriously tough Westchester County Building Trades Council and collected a heaping truck-load of clothing, and their promise to send money. Further acquaintance with labor officialdom was afforded when I became a delegate to the New York Central Trades and Labor Council. I stood up before those hard-boiled bureaucrats and proudly took my little oath of membership, only to be promptly disillusioned by the interminable, futile, smoke-spittoon sessions of that august body.

To some extent, all the Brookwood faculty members functioned as participants in the labor movement; some were involved in many ways. A time was to come when the extent and nature of such involvement would be a subject of intense controversy among us, but this was not the case in the early period. This is, therefore, an appropriate moment to deal with labor political developments in the early Twenties, culminating in the LaFollette-Wheeler Presidential campaign of 1924, the only campaign of any kind, so far as I can recall, in which I actually took the stump on behalf of a candidate for public office. I have never been a candidate for public office myself, though periodically the idea that I should run for Congress or even the Presidency as a pacifist or peace candidate is advanced. Occasionally, I have briefly played with the idea. At some point in these reminiscences I should perhaps try to state my attitude towards the electoral system in a democracy. Suffice it for now to record the rebuke that was administered to me in the course of the 1948 Presidential campaign by an elderly lady of distinguished lineage in one of the Southern states, who was an ardent pacifist. I had written her that, apart from other considerations, I had not been born in this country and therefore could not be a Presidential candidate, or at any rate could not serve if elected. She shot back a note saying that this was "a very picayune and nationalistic excuse."

To return to the Twenties: World War I was followed by a depression and by vicious attacks on organized labor. I have already touched on some aspects of this situation in my accounts of the 1919 Lawrence strike and the vicissitudes of the Amalgamated Textile Workers. The combination of post-war depression and of extreme

reaction, marked especially by a determination to wipe out the start made in union organization in mass-production industries during the war, led to a number of gigantic struggles. They were generally pictured in the press as efforts of the forces of law and order and of the American (and Christian) system of free enterprise to beat back the onrushing wave of revolution. This picture was supposed to justify the anti-Red crusade launched by the Department of Justice in March 1919, when one A. Mitchell Palmer (a graduate of Swarthmore College, alas, and a life-long Quaker) became Woodrow Wilson's Attorney-General, and laid the foundation for certain basic attitudes on the question of dealing with political dissent. These attitudes have since been more subtly and thoroughly applied by the F. B. I., under J. Edgar Hoover. (To offset the reference to Palmer's Quakerism, I should no doubt mention that Hoover is under the ministerial and pastoral care of the same Presbyterian minister in the national capital as President Eisenhower himself. Each of the two religious bodies to which I belong ought to shed a tear for the other.)

The assiduously cultivated notion that the social upheavals of the time were caused by the onrushing wave of revolution was also held by many to justify the terroristic activities of an organization which appeared on the American scene about this time—the American Legion. Actually, the struggles of the period were defensive actions on the part of workers against efforts to beat down wages and, above all, to smash unionism (except in a few skilled trades), so that the power of finance and management should remain uncurbed in industries which had expanded and profited during the war.

William Z. Foster

One of the titanic conflicts was the steel strike of 1919. It was this strike which made a national figure—and for many years a widely respected and admired one—of William Z. Foster. With strong support from such incorruptible and militant unionists as John Fitzpatrick, then and for many years afterwards president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, Foster proved to be a magnificent organizer and agitator. He came out of a syndicalist, I. W. W. background. I think that those of us who knew him in those days felt that he had the ruggedness, straightforwardness, humanitarianism and essential foundation of personal independence (anti-tyranny, anti-state and so on) which we associated with the best of the Wobblies.

Not long after the end of the steel strike, Bill made his first trip to Moscow. Shortly after his return, he came to Brookwood and talked to the students and teachers. He made a favorable impression on quite a

few. He was, after all, a "hero of labor" in the American sense, and he had been to the land of the revolution and had talked with the mysterious and fabulous persons who had "made the revolution." One of the questions in the minds of all labor activists at that time was whether Bill had joined the Communist Party. He sought to create the impression that he had not. I have carried with me all through the years a vivid recollection of my feeling on that day nearly forty years ago. I have lived it over again at fairly frequent intervals since. It was a feeling of uneasiness, certainly not of hostility in any personal sense. I felt that there was a human being inside him, but that it was under restraint, hidden somewhere. The element of straightforwardness was now lacking. There he was, over there, and here was I. It would remain so. Politically, we were not on the same road.

This impression, that Foster had put on blinders, had so to speak been shut in upon himself, was to be fully confirmed by later developments. John Gates, who left the Communist Party early in 1958, and who like many others had been an ardent admirer of Foster, the labor organizer (Samuel Gompers, John L. Lewis, Philip Murray were also in that category), points out in his important book, *The Story of an American Communist*, that in Foster's later years he paid practically no attention to the social and political struggles going on in the United States or elsewhere, but always seemed to have plenty of reserve energy left for internal party controversy and power struggles even after he had been stricken with a bad heart. He was uninterested in America, and pointed to the fact that his books had been translated for Communists into Russian, Chinese and many other languages. "He lived in a make-believe world of his own and though more typically American than most party leaders, he was also strangely remote from his own land and people." I am reminded of a line, having to do with another matter, by a poetess who was a Communist in her youth: "Never lie blind within a dream."

The period was marked also by a bitter strike of miners whose lot had been temporarily eased during the war but who, at least in the case of the soft coal workers, were cast back into the misery of low wages, episodic employment, perpetually hazardous work and company village life, which were to remain their lot until New Deal days. Also involved in desperate defensive battles were sections of the railroad workers. The four operating Brotherhoods—engineers, firemen, conductors and trainmen—constituted a special case, but the railway shop workers and maintenance-of-way men were in much the same position as the workers in big industry. They still had to battle for bare recognition and some security in labor-management relations. As for the operative workers, when in those days anti-

unionists disparaged workers, suggesting that if they had bathtubs, they'd only use them to hold coal, we proudly pointed to the fact that tables of the parentage of enrolled college students showed a larger percentage of locomotive engineers than of any other vocation.

The consequence of the inability of workers to make progress by economic action was, as usual, a turning to political action. Leadership in this turn came primarily from the Railroad Brotherhoods, who were not affiliated with the A. F. of L., but A. F. of L. railroad workers in such unions as the Machinists also played an active part. At a meeting held in February 1922, in Chicago, at the invitation of the Brotherhoods, there were present also representatives of the Farmer-Labor Party; the Non-Partisan League; the Committee of 48 (originally Teddy Roosevelt Republicans); church groups, such as the Methodist Federation for Social Service, the Church League for Democracy and the National Catholic Welfare Council; and the Socialist Party, which was led by the New York attorney, Morris Hillquit, and supported by such Social-Democratic figures as Victor Berger, who had been a congressman from Wisconsin, Daniel Hoan, Milwaukee Socialist leader and many times mayor, and James Oneal, journalist and leading anti-C. P. pamphleteer.

The Chicago meeting formed an organization called the Conference for Progressive Political Action (C. P. P. A.), which should not be confused with the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (C. P. L. A.), which came into being several years later and in which I was to play a much more active part.

The C. P. P. A. had in it a good many people, including the Socialists, who believed that an independent political party should be established on the lines of the British Labor Party. It was faced with the ever-present problem of the anti-independent-political-action stance of the A. F. of L. The outcome of prolonged discussion and manifold maneuvering during 1922-4 was postponement of the issue of a new party but agreement by February 1924 at the C. P. P. A. conference in St. Louis that in the 1924 election C. P. P. A. should set up candidates for President and Vice President, Congress, state legislatures and other offices, candidates "who are pledged to the interests of the producing classes and to the principles of genuine democracy in agriculture, industry and government." The specific proposals of the platform that was eventually adopted were not Socialist, or very radical, but the Socialist Party was accepted as part of C. P. P. A., and the platform contained little or nothing with which Socialists could disagree.

The Socialist Party

Here a brief additional comment on Socialist Party participation in this movement needs to be made. We have pointed out that the C. P. P. A. was the result of

a movement to the left among labor people under the pressure of unemployment, wage cuts and vicious attacks on unionism. S. P. participation in what was not a specifically Socialist political program marked a move to the right so far as the Party was concerned.

The Party had been growing and seemingly headed for an important role in American life in the decade before World War I. When the war came, and especially as the United States itself was drawn in, the Party had had to face the war issue. It is an issue which has been present ever since and which, in my opinion, neither the S. P. in this country nor its counterpart anywhere else has ever satisfactorily resolved. The European Socialist movement had been vocally internationalist and anti-war before 1914. Internationalism and anti-militarism had been deeply ingrained in Socialist life, and accounted in considerable measure for the hold Socialism had on the European masses. This fact was amply demonstrated by the traumatic effect of the collapse of the anti-war stand in the great parties of Germany, France and Great Britain in 1914, and the ascendancy of national loyalties over international working-class solidarity in these movements.

The S. P. in this country officially maintained an anti-war stand, and its leader, Eugene V. Debs, became an immortal hero of the anti-war movement. To a considerable extent, also, the Party continued to have popular confidence and support, whether because of or in spite of its anti-war stand, as the vote of nearly one million, cast for Debs while he was still in prison in 1920, demonstrated. However, this vote was less than four per cent of the popular vote, as against the six per cent Debs had received in 1912.* Moreover, the anti-war stand of the Party had caused bitter and exhausting internal controversy and led to the defection of a large percentage of its leading intellectuals.

The war was hardly over before the controversies centering around the Russian Revolution and the S. P.'s relation to the world Bolshevik movement split so-called right-wing and left-wing Socialists wide apart. The Communist Party eventually emerged out of this turmoil, and from then until now, the two have expended considerable energy in fighting each other. Thus we come in this period upon another characteristic of radical political life in the United States. Occasionally, there has seemed to be an approach to something like a mass socialist or labor party. But most of the time, the radical movement has been sectarian. It may perhaps be argued that objective conditions in this country make the development of a revolutionary, socialist, labor party—perhaps any kind of "third" party—impos-

* I am indebted for such figures (and for refreshing my memory on other points) to David A. Shannon: *The Socialist Party of America*; Macmillan, 1957.

sible, and that the sectarianism which has marked the political left is essentially an effect, rather than a cause. At any rate, it was under these conditions of weakness that the S. P. turned toward the C. P. P. A., for the time being resolving the perpetual problem as to whether to plug away at building the S. P. itself or to regard it as a ginger group in a broader and less radical political party, in favor of the latter.

LaFollette

The C. P. P. A. nominating convention met in Cleveland on July 4, 1924. The candidate nominated for the Presidency was Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., Senator from Wisconsin; for Vice-President, Burton K. Wheeler, Jr., Senator from Montana. There was immense enthusiasm and hope, as I recall. I was there as a delegate, probably from Local 189, American Federation of Teachers. LaFollette was an "ideal" candidate for the occasion. His labor record was excellent. He had long been a spokesman for the dirt farmer. He had made Wisconsin a pioneer in political measures seeking to preserve democratic processes in an increasingly centralized society. His record of voting against United States entry into the war had endeared him to idealists, including pacifists, and it was not a serious handicap in gaining popular support at that juncture, when the revulsion against "the war to end war and save democracy," which was to become nearly universal in the decade following 1924, was already under way.

I rode back in the sleeper to New York from Cleveland with three or four other delegates. One of them was Fiorello H. LaGuardia, then a Republican congressman from Manhattan, who had been one of the big figures in the convention. No one ever met the Little Flower without being impressed by his gusto, his wit, his essential honesty and dedication. If there have to be politicians, let them be LaGuardias!

A further big boost was given to the campaign when in August, the A. F. of L. abandoned its traditional non-partisan policy and endorsed LaFollette and Wheeler. As always in such situations, however, the A. F. of L. did not go all out, and some prominent international union presidents supported the Democratic candidate, John W. Davis; others, like John L. Lewis, backed that great Republican leader, Calvin Coolidge.

As I intimated a while back, I stumped for LaFollette. David K. Niles, who was then associated with the Ford Hall Forum in Boston, and later a member of the Roosevelt entourage, was head of the speakers' bureau, and recruited me to make a number of speeches in Middle Western states, and especially among the Dutch communities in Western Michigan where I had grown up. They were as solidly Republican as Southern whites are solidly Democrat, and I don't think I made much of an impact, though the count was eventually to show

that LaFollette had not done too badly. One of the meetings was in Holland, Michigan, site of Hope College, my *alma mater*, which had graduated me in 1905. It was the first time I had been back in the town since I had committed a whole series of crimes, such as getting fired from a church for my pacifism, getting arrested on the picket line in a strike, and haranguing strike meetings in a plain shirt and without a tie. There was a good turnout at the meeting and a friendly reception. The head of the English department, who had once regarded me as his star protégé, refused to attend. The next day, he did make a concession, as I was later informed, saying that he was pleased to learn that I had not "ranted, but talked common sense—more or less."

One other aspect of the 1924 campaign should be mentioned, which also helped to establish its appeal for labor and other voters. Such organs as the *Saturday Evening Post* tried to pin the Communist label on the LaFollette campaign. There was no basis whatever for such an accusation. As early as December 1922, Communists had been excluded from the C. P. P. A. The next year, they had turned their attention to the Farmer-Labor Party, captured and wrecked it. The C. P. P. A. in its platform opposed "equally the dictatorship of the plutocracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat." The campaign textbook quoted LaFollette as characterizing the Communists as "mortal enemies of the Progressive Movement and democratic ideals."

No doubt the most convincing evidence that the Communists were excluded is in an exchange which took place between Foster and the ailing S. P. leader, Debs. Foster wrote to Debs, rebuking him for "complete capitulation to this petty-bourgeois reformer," LaFollette. "The petty-bourgeois united front is now complete from Hearst to Debs." Debs answered: "You may be right in your criticism of my position, and I may be wrong, as I have often been before. Having no Vatican in Moscow to guide me, I must follow the light that I have, and this I have done in the present instance."

LaFollette polled 4,861,471 popular votes, or seventeen per cent of the total, and got the vote of Wisconsin in the electoral college. He ran a strong third generally and was second in eleven states in the Middle and Far West, including California.

In many respects, it was a terrific showing. But the A. F. of L. announced that the election results showed that "the launching of a third party had been wasted effort." In Chicago, in February 1925, the C. P. P. A. met and decided that without labor support it was neither possible nor sensible to try to form a labor party. It would take a long time to analyze what this teaches about politics in the U. S. A. As was remarked in another context: "Maybe it ain't logical, but it's so."

To be continued in next issue.

IF EVERYTHING RETURNS . . .

Stuart Z. Perkoff

if everything returns to one, what does one return to?
-zen ko-an

the face in the mirror of
the human face
looks out on my face. the eyes.

the hands in the mirror of
the human hands
reach out for my hands. the touch.

the pain in the mirror of
the human pain
strikes out to my pain. the love.

the people
present, the particular
circumstances of his being
there, then

the works, the sermons
the falling three times
under the cross

all these things
naked nailed
flesh by bone by blood by thigh
by heart by tongue by shattered eye
to the wood

a man, naked, screaming, hanging there, only
not
screaming.

did what he knew only
he cd.
he stayed
there

it hurt, it really
hurt, his hands
hurt & his feet
his whole flesh was real
pain

& he was thirsty.

the salt in the mirror of
the human eye
burns at my eye. the face.

the wounds in the mirror of
the human hand
bleed from my hand. the touch.

the nails in the mirror of
the human love
tear thru my love. the pain.

CHICAGO EXHIBIT To Benefit Liberation

Dear Editors:

I'm trying to set up an auction of paintings contributed by artists, proceeds thereof to go to LIBERATION. You might buzz any Chicago artists you know to get in touch with me. When and if this comes off I'll let you know. But my doing this hardly means I think the magazine is wonderful. In fact, the November issue was poor, I thought, except for Lyttle and letters. But it's as it is with my teeth—they may be defective, but there aren't too many left—and false ones just won't do—so I can't afford to lose a molar, cavities and all, not if I can help it.

Felix Singer
56 W. Elm St.
Chicago 10, Ill.

REGINALD REYNOLDS

We were saddened, as our readers will be, by the news of the sudden death of Reginald Reynolds in Australia last month. It was characteristic of his dedication to the struggle against war that contrary to his doctor's advice, he had dropped his job on the New Statesman of London, and had undertaken an Australian lecture tour on nuclear problems and race relations.

As a youth he was a trusted co-worker of Gandhi. In addition to being active in pacifist movements, such as the Peace Committee of the Society of Friends and the Peace Pledge Union, he put forth penetrating analyses and imaginative proposals which were for years a force in the world movement for nonviolence. He was also a distinguished literary figure, one of the most brilliant humorists and satirists in the English-speaking world. Among his writings are books on Beards; Cleanliness and Godliness; and an autobiography entitled *My Life and Crimes*. We are informed that Reginald's life of Gandhi for children was finished before he left for Australia and will be published in England this spring.

We were honored in having Reginald Reynolds as one of our Contributors, and our readers were enriched by his lively pieces. He is one of the people who, in Stephen Spender's memorable line, have "left the vivid air signed with their honor."

The Editors

Martin Luther King, Jr.

309 South Jackson Street
Montgomery, Alabama

Minister
Dexter Avenue Baptist Church
454 Dexter Avenue

President
Montgomery Improvement
Association Inc.
530 South Union Street

January 16, 1959

The Editors
Liberation magazine
110 Christopher St.
New York 14, N.Y.

Dear Editors,

I was extremely sorry to hear that Liberation is having financial difficulties. Enclosed is my small contribution. I wish it could be more.

I am convinced Liberation makes a unique contribution to the central issue of our time - the relevance of non-violence to the struggle for peace and social change. So I am confident that the subscribers and friends of Liberation will not let it go under. Good luck.

Sincerely,

Martin
Martin Luther King, Jr.

Liberation

110 Christopher Street
New York 14, N. Y.

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